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Because of scale effects, idea-based growth models imply that larger 
countries should be much richer than smaller ones. New trade models 
share the same counterfactual feature. In fact, new trade models 
exhibit other counterfactual implications associated with scale 
effects: import shares decrease and relative income levels increase 
too steeply with country size. We argue that these implications are 
largely a result of the standard assumption that countries are fully 
integrated domestically. We depart from this assumption by treating 
countries as collections of regions that face positive costs to trade 
among themselves. The resulting model is largely consistent with the 
data. (JEL F11, F14, F43, O47, R12)
Aggregate economies of scale are so central a feature of innovation-led growth 
theory that, in Jones’ (2005, p. 1089) words, “rejecting one is largely equivalent to 
rejecting the other.” Because of scale economies, idea-based growth models such as 
Jones (1995) and Kortum (1997) imply that larger countries should be richer than 
smaller ones.1 There is some disagreement in the literature as to whether such scale 
effects are present in the data, but it is safe to say that they are very small compared 
to those implied by the theory.2
New trade models such as Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2001), and Melitz 
(2003) are also idea-based models, and carry the same counterfactual  implication 
that real income per capita strongly increases with country size. One might expect 
1 First-generation endogenous growth models such as Romer (1990) feature “strong” scale effects, whereby 
scale increases growth, whereas second-generation semi-endogenous growth models such as Jones (1995) and 
Kortum (1997) feature “weak” scale effects, whereby scale increases income levels rather than growth (see Jones 
2005 for a detailed discussion). Models that do not display any scale effects, such as Lucas and Moll (2014), depart 
from the standard assumption that ideas are nonrival by assuming that knowledge can only be used in production 
when it is embodied in individuals with limited time endowments, and that individuals face search frictions in 
learning about better ideas. 
2 Rose (2006) finds no scale effects in the data. 
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scale effects in such models to be offset by the fact that small countries tend to gain 
more from trade than large ones. It turns out, however, that although small countries 
do gain more from trade, these gains are not large enough to neutralize the under-
lying scale effects. In fact, new trade models exhibit other counterfactual implica-
tions associated with scale effects; in particular, import shares decrease and relative 
income levels increase too steeply with country size.
One way in which the literature has reconciled innovation-led growth theories 
with the observation that income per capita does not increase with country size is 
by assuming that scale effects operate at the world rather than the country level 
(see Jones 2005 for a detailed discussion). Indeed, if foreign ideas can be used for 
domestic production, effective technology levels would vary less than proportion-
ally with country size, weakening country-level scale effects.
In this paper we focus on an alternative channel which has been relatively unex-
plored, can be easily inferred from the data, and is arguably of first-order impor-
tance in reconciling the standard model with the data: the existence of domestic 
trade costs. Specifically, we depart from the usual assumption that countries are 
fully integrated domestically, as if they were a single dot in space, and reinterpret 
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade as applied to subnational economies, 
or “regions”: as a result, each country is formed by a group of regions that face 
positive costs to trade among themselves. This assumption is consistent with the 
empirical evidence, which clearly shows that domestic trade costs are large.3 We 
further allow technology levels to be proportional to the size of the economy, as 
in Krugman (1980); Jones (1995); Kortum (1997); Eaton and Kortum (2001); and 
Melitz (2003). As in the standard growth and trade models, this assumption leads to 
aggregate increasing returns to scale, but in our model these scale effects are (par-
tially) offset by the presence of domestic trade costs. Intuitively, to the extent that 
large countries are composed of more regions, trade costs among regions reduce the 
advantage of country size and weaken scale effects; big counterfactual scale effects 
arise in the standard model precisely as a result of the crude treatment of geography.
We calibrate the model using data on population and geography for 287 metro-
politan areas, international trade flows for 26 OECD countries, and intranational 
trade flows for the United States. We calibrate the key parameter determining the 
strength of economies of scale by appealing to the growth and trade literature. Trade 
costs between regions, both within and across countries, are estimated from distance 
and trade data between metropolitan areas. The calibration reveals that domestic 
trade costs cut in half the elasticity of productivity with respect to country size 
implied by the standard model, getting closer to the small elasticity we observe in 
the data. For a small country like Denmark, the model with no domestic trade costs 
implies that its productivity level would be 38 percent of the US level while in the 
data it is 94 percent. In contrast, our calibrated model implies a relative productivity 
level for Denmark of 80 percent.
3 For the United States, Canada, and China, Tombe and Winter (2014) calculate a range between 100 and 140 
percent; Agnosteva, Anderson, and Yotov (2014) calculate them in 109 percent for Canadian provinces; and Allen 
and Arkolakis (2014) estimate them in 55 percent for US metropolitan areas. Relatedly, Hillberry and Hummels 
(2008) find, for the United States, that manufacturing shipments between establishments in the same zip code are 
three times larger than between establishments in different zip codes. 
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Even with domestic trade costs, our calibrated model exhibits scale effects that 
are stronger than in the data. We argue that this difference could be interpreted as 
evidence of the importance of scale effects operating at the world level. Our paper 
shows that the presence of domestic trade costs makes international technology dif-
fusion less important, but not irrelevant, in reconciling the theory with the data.
Our paper makes a contribution to an emerging literature exploring the interac-
tion between international trade and domestic economic geography using quanti-
tative models, such as Cosar and Fajgelbaum (2016); Allen and Arkolakis (2014); 
Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014); and Redding (2015). In particular, Redding 
(2015) also extends the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model by modeling each country 
as a collection of imperfectly integrated regions. The insight from his paper is that 
reallocation of labor across regions is consequential for the gains from trade in each 
location. In contrast, our focus is at the level of countries rather than regions: we 
focus on the extent to which including domestic trade costs improves the fit of the 
standard model with the country-level data, with special emphasis on country-level 
scale effects.
Our paper is also related to a literature that studies the relationship between 
country size, openness, and productivity. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and 
Anderson and Yotov (2010) show that in a standard gravity model, under some 
special conditions, home bias increases with country size, leading to lower import 
shares for larger countries. At the empirical level, Redding and Venables (2004) 
and Head and Mayer (2011) show that income increases with a measure of “market 
potential,” which is increasing in country size, while Frankel and Romer (1999); 
Ades and Glaeser (1999); Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000); and Alcala and 
Ciccone (2004) document a positive effect of country size and trade openness on 
income levels. Other papers fail to find a positive effect of country size on produc-
tivity (Rose 2006). Our contribution to this literature is to show that, relative to the 
data, country-level scale effects are too strong in models without domestic trade 
costs, and that adding these costs allows the model to better matches the observed 
relationship between country size and productivity, import shares, relative income 
levels, and prices.4
Finally, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2010) calibrate an Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) model to match observed trade flows and cross-country income 
levels. Both of these calibrations assume that there are no domestic trade costs, 
but allow technology or efficiency levels to vary across countries. In fact, strong 
scale effects are avoided in these two calibrated models by having technology levels 
decreasing rapidly with country size. Since it is hard to defend such systematic vari-
ation, we calibrate technology parameters to observed R&D intensities, which do 
not vary systematically with country size in our sample of OECD countries.
4 When estimating market potential, Redding and Venables (2004) and Head and Mayer (2011) recognized 
the importance of domestic trade costs and estimated gravity equations that include the domestic trade pair and a 
measure of internal distance (e.g., a transformation of country area) to proxy for domestic trade costs. They did not 
explore, however, the role of domestic frictions on cross-country income levels and import shares. 
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I. The Model
Our starting point is the Ricardian trade model developed by Eaton and Kortum 
(2002)—henceforth, EK—with two key modifications: domestic trade costs and 
scale effects. We introduce these two modifications one by one in the next two sub-
sections. The third subsection derives analytical results for the model with domestic 
trade costs and scale effects in the special case in which all regions within each 
country are fully symmetric.
A. Domestic Trade Costs
Domestic trade costs emerge naturally by applying the EK framework to sub-
national economies, or “regions.” There are  M subnational economies (regions) 
indexed by  m and  N countries indexed by  n . Let  Ω n be the set of regions belonging 
to country  n and  M n be the number of regions in that set. Labor is the only factor of 
production, available in quantity  l m in region  m . There is no labor mobility within 
or across countries.5
There is a continuum of goods in the interval  [0, 1] , and preferences are constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) with elasticity of substitution  σ . Technologies are 
linear with good-specific productivities in region  m drawn from a Fréchet distribu-
tion with parameters  θ > σ − 1 and  t m . These draws are independent across goods 
and across countries. There are iceberg trade costs  d mk ≥ 1 to export from  k to  m , 
with  d mm = 1 and  d mk ≤  d ms d sk for all  m, s, k (triangular inequality). There is per-
fect competition.
Bilateral trade flows between regions satisfy the standard expression in the EK 
model,
(1)  x mk =   t k v k 
−θ d mk −θ ________   ∑ s   t s v s −θ d ms −θ x m ,  
where  v k is the wage in region  k and  x m ≡  ∑ k   x mk is total expenditure in region  m . 
In turn, price indices are
(2)  p m =  γ −1 ( ∑ k t k v k −θ d mk −θ ) 
−1/θ ,  
where  γ ≡ Γ ( 1 − σ _θ + 1) 
1/(σ−1) > 0 . Trade balance at the region level implies 
that  x m =  v m l  m , so that the labor market clearing condition in region  m entails
(3)  v m l  m =  ∑ 
k
   t m v m −θ d km −θ ________   ∑ s   t s v s −θ d ks −θ v k l k . 
5 In the working paper version we allow for perfect labor mobility within countries while assuming that workers 
are heterogeneous in their productivity across regions. The main aggregation result in Proposition 1 as well as the 
results discussed for the case of symmetric regions remain valid, while the quantitative results present negligible 
changes. 
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This constitutes a system that we can solve to determine equilibrium wages across 
all regions.
We introduce additional notation to keep track of country-level variables. 
Let  X ni ≡  ∑ k∈ Ω i      ∑ m∈ Ω n    x mk denote total trade flows from country  i to country  n , 
and let  X n ≡  ∑ m∈ Ω n    x m ,  L  n ≡  ∑ m∈ Ω n    l  m and  w n ≡  X n / L  n denote country  n’s total 
income, total labor, and average nominal income per worker, respectively. The aver-
age real income of workers in country  n is  U n ≡  ∑ m∈ Ω n    ( l  m / L  n )  v m / p m . Finally, 
let  λ ni ≡  X ni / X n denote country-level trade shares.
We now establish a basic aggregation result, namely that if there were no domes-
tic trade costs, the model would generate the same country-level implications as 
the EK model. No domestic trade costs imply that  d mk = 1 for all  m, k ∈  Ω n . By 
the triangular inequality,  d mk =  d m′k′ for all  m, m′ ∈  Ω n and  k, k′ ∈  Ω i (i.e., interna-
tional trade costs are the same for all regions within a country), and  p m =  p k for all 
m, k ∈  Ω n . Combined with  (3) , we get the following proposition (all proofs are in 
the online Appendix).
PROPOSITION 1: If there are no domestic trade costs, country-level trade flows 
and price indices are, respectively,
(4)  X ni =   T i w i 
−θ τ ni −θ _________   ∑ j  T j w j −θ τ nj −θ X n ,  
and
(5)  P n  =  γ −1 ( ∑ i T i w i −θ τ ni −θ ) 
−1/θ ,  
where the country-level technology parameter is
(6)  T i =  ( ∑ m∈ Ω i  ( l  m / L i ) θ/ (1+θ)  t m 1/ (1+θ)  ) 
1+θ ,  
and country-level trade costs are
(7)  τ ni ≡  d mk for m ∈  Ω n and k ∈  Ω i for n ≠ i, 
with  τ nn = 1. Country-level welfare is given by
(8)  U n = γ ×  T n 1/θ ×  λ nn −1/θ . 
In the presence of domestic trade costs, a log-linear gravity equation for 
 country-level trade flows as in (4) no longer holds, except for (at least) two special 
cases: when regions within each country are fully symmetric; and when trade costs 
are as in a hub-and-spoke trade system, so that all international trade is done through 
a single location (e.g., a port) in each country. The first case is studied in detail 
below, while the second case is studied in the working paper version of this paper 
(Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Saborío-Rodríguez 2014).
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Domestic trade costs also matter for the gains from trade. Whereas in the case of 
frictionless trade or symmetric regions (below), the gains from trade, as defined in 
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), are given by  1 −  λ nn 1/θ , this result 
no longer holds except for the special case with symmetric regions (see below and 
the discussion in Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Saborío-Rodríguez  2014).
B. Scale Effects
We have so far treated technology parameters  t m as exogenous. We now argue that 
technology levels should be allowed to depend positively on the size of the region. 
Building on Proposition 1, we then show that, in the case of no domestic trade costs, 
this dependency leads to aggregate economies of scale.
It is natural to expect larger regions to have better technologies. Suppose that we 
merged two identical regions with technology parameter  t into a single region. It is 
easy to show that the new region would have a technology parameter  2t .6 Thus, if 
two regions  m and  k are identical except that region  m is twice as large as region  k , 
then  t m = 2 t k . Since labor is the only factor of production in our model, then the 
size of a region is given by its workforce, and so  t m will be proportional to  l m .7 This 
relation between technology levels and population was derived formally by Eaton 
and Kortum (2001) in a model of endogenous innovation and Bertrand competition, 
and it also emerges from trade models with monopolistic competition, as we discuss 
below. This is captured formally by the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Technology Scales with Population):  t m =  ϕ n l  m for all  m ∈  Ω n .
We allow  ϕ n to vary with  n to reflect differences in “innovation intensity” across 
countries. This parameter is calibrated to R&D employment shares in the quanti-
tative analysis. The important part of this assumption, however, is that technology 
levels are proportional to population.
It is worth noting that equivalent formulations of our model plus Assumption 1 
could be derived building on Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003) rather than EK (der-
ivations are in the online Appendix). With Krugman (1980), Assumption 1 follows 
immediately from the free entry condition combined with the standard assumption 
that the fixed cost of production is not systematically related to country size. With 
Melitz (2003), we would need to assume that the productivity distribution is Pareto, 
as in Chaney (2008). If the Pareto shape parameter is  θ and either  θ ≈ σ − 1 or 
the fixed cost of selling in market  m is proportional to its population,  l m , then again 
Assumption 1 would hold because of free entry.
Assumption 1 leads to country-level scale effects: everything else equal, larger 
countries should exhibit higher real income levels. We can see this most directly in 
the case of no domestic trade costs. Proposition 1 combined with Assumption 1 and 
6 This result follows from the fact that if  x and  y are distributed Fréchet with parameters  θ and  t x and  t y , respec-
tively, then  max {x, y} is distributed Fréchet with parameters  θ and  t x +  t y . 
7 Formally, let a “technology” be a productivity  ξ drawn from a Fréchet distribution with parameters  θ and ϕ, 
and assume that the number of technologies per good is equal to the number of workers. It is then easy to show that 
the best technology for a good,  max ξ , is distributed Fréchet with parameters  θ and  ϕ l m . 
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the expression for  T n in (6) yields  T n = ϕ n L  n , which plugged into (8) reveals that 
the average real wage in country  n is given by
(9)  U n = γ ×  ( ϕ n L  n ) 1/θ ×  λ nn −1/θ . 
Thus, conditional on trade shares and innovation intensity, average real income lev-
els increase with country size with an elasticity of  1/θ . This is because a larger 
population is linked to a higher stock of nonrival ideas (i.e., technologies), and more 
ideas imply a superior technology frontier. The strength of this effect is linked to the 
Fréchet parameter  θ : the lower is  θ , the higher is the dispersion of productivity draws 
from this distribution, and the more an increase in the stock of ideas improves the 
technology frontier. These are the aggregate economies of scale that play a critical 
role in semi-endogenous growth models (Kortum 1997) and that underpin the gains 
from openness in EK-type models (Eaton and Kortum 2001; Arkolakis et al. 2008).
C. A Special Case: Symmetric Regions
We now study how domestic trade costs affect the strength of scale effects for the 
simple case in which regions within each country are fully symmetric, as captured 
by the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2 (Region-Level Symmetry):  l  m =  l  m ′  for all  m, m′ ∈  Ω n , 
and  d mk =  d m′k′  for all  m, m′ ∈  Ω n and  k, k′ ∈  Ω i .
We focus here on the case of symmetric regions because it is the only one for which 
we can provide analytical results for real wages given trade shares. This case also has 
the advantage that it leads to very similar results to the EK model for country-level 
trade flows, and yet shows clearly how domestic trade costs weaken scale effects. In 
Section II, we calibrate the model imposing Assumption 1, but not Assumption 2, 
and present quantitative results for the strength of scale effects for real wages. We 
also present results for the case with both Assumptions 1 and 2, which, thanks to 
Proposition 2, is easier to calibrate.
PROPOSITION 2: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, country-level trade shares and price 
indices are as in  (4) and  (5) , respectively, with country-level technology parameters 
given by
(10)  T i =  ϕ i L  i ,  
international trade costs  τ ni as in  (7) , and domestic trade costs given by
(11)  τ nn ≡  ( 1 _  M n +  (1 −  1 _  M n )  δ n −θ ) 
−1/θ ,  
where  δ n ≡  d mk  for  m ≠ k with  m, k ∈  Ω n . In addition, country-level welfare is
(12)  U n = γ ×  ϕ n 1/θ  ⏟R&D Intensity ×  L n 
1/θ  ⏟Pure Scale Effect ×  τ nn 
−1   ⏟Domestic Frictions ×  λ nn 
−1/θ  ⏟Gains from Trade . 
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According to Proposition 2, domestic trade costs  τ nn are a weighted power mean 
with exponent  −θ of the cost of intraregional trade, which we assume is 1, and the 
cost of trade between regions belonging to the same country, which is denoted  δ n , 
with weights given by  1/ M n and  1 − 1/ M n . Note that countries with the same  δ n 
may have different  τ nn because of their different size; in particular, larger countries 
would have larger domestic trade costs.
The key result in Proposition 2 is in (12). This expression shows that there are 
four distinct forces that determine real wages across countries: innovation intensity, 
pure scale effects, domestic trade costs, and the gains from trade. In the presence of 
domestic trade costs, economies of scale depend on how  τ nn is affected by country 
size,  L  n .8 To derive sharper results, assume for the moment that country size scales 
with the number of regions,  L  n / L i =  M n / M i , and that  δ n = δ , for all  n so that all 
variation in  τ nn comes from variation in the number of regions  M n . In particular,  τ nn 
is increasing in  M n , so that domestic trade costs offset scale effects. More specifi-
cally, the strength of economies of scale under the presence of domestic trade costs, 
conditional on trade shares, is given by  ε ≡ ∂ ln U n / ∂ ln  L  n = (1/θ) (δ/ τ nn ) −θ : if δ = 1 , then  τ nn = 1 and  ε = 1/θ ; otherwise the term  (δ/ τ nn ) −θ is lower than 1 
and offsets economies of scale,  ε < 1/θ .
Proposition 2 lays out the implications of domestic trade costs on real wages 
conditional on trade shares. To derive analytical results for the unconditional effects 
of country size in the presence of domestic trade costs, we need to impose some 
additional restrictions. In particular, we assume that international and domestic 
trade costs are uniform and that countries are symmetric in terms of their innovation 
intensity and region size.
ASSUMPTION 3 (Country-Level Symmetry):  l m = l  for all  m ,  δ n = δ and  ϕ n = ϕ 
for all  n , and  τ ni = τ  for all  n ≠ i .
Under this (admittedly very strong) assumption, which we maintain only for 
the next Proposition, we can characterize how country size matters also for import 
shares, nominal wages, and price levels.
PROPOSITION 3: Assume Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. If  τ > δ , then larger coun-
tries have lower import shares, higher wages, and lower price levels. If  τ = δ , then 
larger countries have lower import shares, but wages and prices do not vary with 
country size.
As expected, import shares decline with country size and large countries gain less 
from trade, but aggregate economies of scale are strong enough so that the overall 
effect is for real wages to increase with size. Proposition 3 also establishes that, 
if  τ > δ , real wages increase with country size both because of higher wages and 
8 While the elasticity of  U n with respect to  ϕ n ,  L n , and  1/ λ nn is  1/θ , the elasticity with respect to  τ nn is simply −1 . The reason is that whereas  ϕ n ,  L n , and  1/ λ nn affect  U n indirectly through  T n or trade, the effect of trade costs 
on utility is direct. This is most clearly appreciated in the limit as  M n → ∞ , in which case  τ nn =  δ n and hence, a 
higher  τ nn leads to a proportional decrease in welfare. 
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lower prices. More importantly, these scale effects disappear when  τ = δ , suggest-
ing that domestic trade costs weaken scale effects.
This result is illustrated more generally in Figure 1. For  θ = 4 , we alternately 
fixed  δ = 1 and  δ = 2.7 , and chose  τ for each  δ to match the same average import 
share (the one observed for our sample of 26 countries)—we want to make sure that 
both models match equally well this moment from the data. As we explain in more 
detail in the next section, we take the number of regions of a country to be the number 
of metropolitan areas with more than half a million habitants, and we take country 
size to be a measure of equipped labor. The figure shows the implied import shares, 
nominal wages, real wages, and price levels against country size for the model with 
no domestic trade costs (stars), and the model with those trade costs (circles). All 
four variables vary strongly with size in the model with no domestic trade costs, but 
this dependence is severely weakened when domestic trade costs are considered.
II. Quantitative Analysis
The goal of this section is to evaluate the role of domestic trade costs in rec-
onciling the standard model with the data on real wages. Additionally, we show 
Figure 1. The Role of Domestic Frictions: Numerical Example (Relative to US, in logs)
Notes: No dom.fric. refers to the model without domestic frictions. Dom.fric. refers to the model with domestic fric-
tions and symmetric regions. Both models have uniform international trade costs. Country size refers to equipped 
labor.
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the role of domestic trade costs for other variables such as nominal wages, price 
levels, and import shares, across countries of different size. We first only impose 
Assumption 1 (technology scales with population) and then we also explore the case 
with Assumption 2 (symmetric regions).
A. Calibration Procedure
We consider a set of 26 OECD countries for which all the variables needed are 
available. Additionally, we restrict the sample to this set of countries to ensure that 
the main differences across countries are dominated by size, geography, and R&D, 
rather than other variables outside the model. Importantly, as explained in detail 
below, among this set of countries, the definition in the data for “region” is fairly 
homogeneous.
We need to calibrate the parameter  θ , the variables  M n and  ϕ n for all  n , and  l m for 
all  m , as well as the matrix of trade costs  d mk , for all  m, k .
Parameter  θ .—The value of  θ is critical for our exercise. We turn to the growth lit-
erature to calibrate this parameter. Assuming that  l m grows at a constant rate  g L > 0 
in all countries and invoking Assumption 1, the growth rate of  t m is equal to  g L , 
for all regions and countries. The long-run income growth rate is then  g =  g L /θ. 
With  g L = 0.048 (the growth rate of research employment), and  g = 0.01 (the 
growth rate of TFP) among a group of rich OECD countries, both from Jones 
(2002), it follows that  θ = 4.8 . Jones and Romer (2010) follow a similar procedure 
and conclude that the data support  g/ g L = 0.25 , which implies  θ = 4 . We choose θ = 4, which is also in the range of estimates from the trade literature.9 Notice that 
even though our model is fully consistent with estimates of  θ provided by the growth 
literature, it is not fully consistent with estimates provided by the trade literature 
since our general model does not deliver a log-linear gravity equation at the country 
level, except for the case of symmetric regions.
Number of Regions.—We assume that the number of regions for each country in 
the model,  M n , equals the number of metropolitan areas observed in the data, for 
each country. We use data on 287 metropolitan areas with a population of 500,000 
habitants or more. For all countries, except Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, and 
Iceland, the data are from the OECD Metropolitan Areas Database; for these four 
remaining countries, we use data from the OECD Regional Database.10 The data 
on population are for the year 2000. Column 8 in Table 1 presents the number of 
regions for each country. The number of metropolitan areas is strongly correlated 
with our measure of country size defined below (the correlation is 0.90).11
9 Head and Mayer (2014) survey the estimates for the trade elasticity in the literature and conclude that, even 
though the variance is large, the mean estimate, for the subset of structural gravity estimates, is −3.78. Among the 
most recent estimates, Simonovska and Waugh (2014) place  θ between  4 and  5 . 
10 The OECD has developed a harmonized definition of urban areas, which includes metropolitan areas, to 
overcome limitations linked to administrative definitions (OECD 2012). An urban area is defined as a functional 
economic unit characterized by densely inhabited “urban cores” and “hinterlands” whose labor market is highly 
integrated with the cores. 
11 The population accounted for by our sample of metropolitan areas ranges from 25 and 27 percent for Norway 
and Finland, respectively, to 72 and 82 percent for Korea and Benelux, with 53 percent for the United States and 
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Technology and Country Size.—We calibrate the parameter  t m imposing 
Assumption 1,  t m =  ϕ n l m .12 We assume that the variable  ϕ n varies directly with the 
share of R&D employment observed in the data at the country level (since data on 
R&D by region are either very low quality or unavailable). We use data on R&D 
 employment from the World Development Indicators averaged over the nineties. 
The size elasticity of R&D employment shares, for our sample of countries, is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero (−0.07, standard error 0.09), indicating that 
there is no systematic pattern between R&D intensity and size in our sample.13
68 percent for Japan. For some countries, these shares may seem low, but one has to keep in mind that these are 
the major urban areas (and their hinterlands) which concentrate most of the manufacturing activity and workers. 
12 Interestingly, we do find some evidence of scale effects operating at the level of metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSA), for the United States: the elasticity of real GDP per capita (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) to 
population (from the census) across 349 MSAs, for 2007, is 0.12 (standard error 0.011). This evidence not only 
supports imposing Assumption 1 at the levels of metropolitan areas, but also the assumption that trade is frictionless 
within those same geographic units. 
13 Using the number of patents per unit of equipped labor registered by country  n ’s residents, at home and 
abroad, from the World Intellectual Property Organization (average over the period 2000–2005), rather than R&D 
 employment shares, as a proxy for  ϕ n , does not change our results below. Similarly to R&D employment shares, 
small countries do not have a systematically higher number of patents per capita. 
Table 1—Data Summary
Domestic 
trade
RGDP 
p.c.
CGDP 
p.c.
Price 
index
R&D 
emp.
Equipped 
labor
Country 
size
Number of 
regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (3)/(2) (5) (6) (7) = (5)  × (6) (8)
Australia 0.83 0.97 0.78 0.80 0.68 7.92 0.05 8
Austria 0.44 1.12 1.09 0.98 0.49 2.92 0.01 3
Benelux 0.20 1.16 1.08 0.94 0.58 9.30 0.05 9
Canada 0.49 0.86 0.68 0.79 0.63 13.99 0.08 9
Switzerland 0.51 0.88 1.12 1.27 0.60 3.60 0.02 3
Denmark 0.42 0.94 1.15 1.22 0.63 2.25 0.01 1
Spain 0.71 1.14 0.83 0.73 0.38 10.76 0.04 8
Finland 0.68 0.84 0.92 1.09 1.23 2.06 0.02 1
France 0.68 1.07 1.08 1.01 0.59 20.08 0.10 15
Germany 0.70 0.92 0.96 1.04 0.60 33.73 0.18 24
Greece 0.63 0.90 0.63 0.70 0.30 2.90 0.01 2
Hungary 0.48 0.65 0.28 0.44 0.29 2.47 0.01 1
Ireland 0.28 1.32 1.25 0.95 0.51 1.04 0.005 1
Iceland 0.40 1.17 1.09 0.93 0.96 0.11 0.001 1
Italy 0.78 1.20 1.07 0.89 0.29 16.73 0.04 11
Japan 0.94 0.72 0.98 1.37 0.80 66.31 0.46 36
Korea 0.83 0.63 0.44 0.71 0.51 16.04 0.07 10
Mexico 0.63 0.78 0.40 0.51 0.06 16.60 0.01 33
Norway 0.57 1.11 1.07 0.97 0.81 2.21 0.02 1
New Zealand 0.64 0.74 0.61 0.82 0.48 1.48 0.01 1
Poland 0.68 0.50 0.24 0.48 0.32 10.07 0.03 8
Portugal 0.59 0.97 0.70 0.73 0.33 2.48 0.01 2
Sweden 0.59 0.81 0.97 1.20 0.83 3.90 0.03 3
Turkey 0.74 0.61 0.26 0.43 0.07 10.83 0.01 11
United Kingdom 0.64 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.53 20.83 0.10 15
United States 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 130.10 1.00 70
Notes: Domestic trade in manufacturing (column 1) is calculated as a share of absorption in manufacturing. RGDP 
p.c. (column 2) is PPP-adjusted real GDP divided by equipped labor (in column 6, in million of units). CGDP p.c. 
(column 3) is GDP in current US dollars divided by equipped labor. The price index (column 4) is GPP in current 
US dollars divided by real GDP. R&D employment (column 5) is calculated as a percentage of total employment. 
Column 8 shows the number of metropolitan areas with more than 500,000 habitants. Real and current GDP per 
capita, as well as the price index and country size, are relative to the United States. Variables are averages over the 
period 1996–2001.
3170 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW OCTObER 2016
We pair  l m in the model to equipped labor in the data to account for differences in 
physical and human capital per worker. This variable is available at the country level 
from Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005). We treat equipped labor in region  m as 
the product of country-level equipped labor ( L n ) and the population share of region 
m in country  n . The population share of region  m is the population of a metropolitan 
area in our sample as a share of the total population in our sample of metropolitan 
areas belonging to country  n .14
We refer to the term  ϕ n L n as R&D-adjusted country size, and we adopt it as our 
measure of country size. The values for this variable are shown in Column 7 of 
Table 1.
Trade Costs.—We need to calibrate the whole matrix of trade costs between 
regions,  d mk , for  m ∈  Ω i and  k ∈  Ω n , for all  i, n . This amounts to a  287 × 287 
matrix, i.e.,  ( ∑ n   M n ) 2 . The obvious limitation is that data on trade flows between any 
two regions in our sample are not available, except for the United States and Canada. 
Hence, we proceed by imposing more structure on the trade costs and assume that
(13)  d mk =  β 0  ι mk  β 1 1− ι mk  dis t mk  β 2 ι mk + β 3 (1− ι mk )  ,  
with  d mm = 1 . The variable  dis t mk denotes geographical distance between region  m 
and  k which is computed from longitude and latitude data for each metropolitan area 
in our sample. The variable  ι mk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if  m and  k belong 
to the same country, and 0 otherwise.
The distance elasticities within and across countries,  β 2 and  β 3 , respectively, are 
disciplined invoking ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of gravity equations. 
These estimates indicate that the distance elasticities for inter-regional and inter-
national trade flows are in the same range. Table 2 presents the results for different 
gravity specifications. For our sample of 26 countries, the distance elasticity ranges 
from −1.01 to −1.1. These estimates are within the range estimated in the litera-
ture, as surveyed by Head and Mayer (2014). Using data on trade flows among US 
regions, we get a distance elasticity that ranges from −1.02 to −1.06, as shown in 
columns 3–5 in Table 2. Allen and Arkolakis (2014) estimate a reduced-form dis-
tance elasticity between −0.95 and −1.35, using 122 CFS regions within the United 
States, when trade is restricted to road mode, for 2007. Tombe and Winter (2014) 
estimate a trade-elasticity of −1.25, for inter-provincial trade in Canada, for 2005.15 
Given this evidence, we impose  β 2 =  β 3 =  β dist , and target a trade-distance elas-
ticity of −1.05.16 For  θ = 4 , the implied coefficient is  β dist = 0.27 .
14 Effectively, we are assigning the total country-level equipped labor to the regions in our sample, for each 
country, proportionally to their importance in terms of population. 
15 Using data for trade flows among regions of the European Union, as estimated by Thissen, Diodato, and 
van Oort (2013), and including a same-country dummy in the regression, we estimate a trade-distance elasticity of 
−1.14 (standard error 0.008). 
16 Since our general model does not deliver a log-linear gravity equation at the country level, we cannot take 
these trade-distance elasticities directly from the data and impose them in (13) using  β dist = β dist ols /θ . Instead, given 
an initial guess for  β dist , and using  θ = 4 , we compute the model’s equilibrium, generate data on trade flows, and 
estimate the same gravity equation as in the data. We then iterate on  β dist until the trade-distance elasticity in the 
model is −1.05.
3171Ramondo et al.: tRade, domestic FRictions, and scale eFFectsVol. 106 no. 10
The coefficients  β 0 and  β 1 are chosen to jointly match the share of total intra-
regional trade in total domestic trade for the United States ( ∑ m∈ Ω n    x mm / X nn in the 
model), and the average country-level bilateral trade shares in manufacturing 
observed in the data.
We use data from the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) on manufacturing trade 
flows between subnational units within the United States. Intratrade shares range 
from 0.35 when we use 100 geographical areas, to 0.55 when we use the 55 met-
ropolitan areas which are also included in the OECD dataset, for 2007.17 We tar-
get a mid-value of 0.45, implying that  45 percent of domestic US trade flows are 
intraregional.
Data on country-pair level trade flows  X ni are from the OECD’s STAN database, 
averaged over 1996–2001, while country-level absorption  X n is calculated (from the 
same source) as gross production minus total exports plus total imports from coun-
tries in our sample. In our sample, the average international (bilateral) trade share is 
0.0156. The resulting coefficients are  β 0 = 2.33 and  β 1 = 2.89 .18
Results.—The calibrated model captures well the patterns of trade observed in 
the data. In particular, the model captures 96 percent of the variation observed in 
the data on bilateral country-level trade shares; the correlation coefficient between 
 country-level import shares in the data and the model is 0.80, and 0.65 if instead 
17 There is a discrepancy between the definition of metropolitan areas in the OECD and the CFS for the United 
States: of the 70 metropolitan areas recorded in the OECD dataset, only 55 can be matched with the ones in the 
CFS for which trade data are available. Our 100 geographical areas include 48 consolidated statistical areas (CSA), 
18 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), and 33 units represent the remaining portions of (some of) the states. For 
each of these  99 geographical units, we compute the total purchases from the United States and subtract trade with 
the 99 geographical units to get trade with the rest of the United States, which is considered the one-hundredth 
geographical unit. 
18 We are not including exogenous international trade imbalances in our calibration. Those imbalances may 
affect the terms of trade and the real wage, but since they are typically small, as a share of GDP, and not systemati-
cally correlated with country size, adding them to the standard model with no domestic trade costs does not change 
the results noticeably: implied scale effects remain basically the same. We strongly conjecture that the same would 
still be true in our model where each country is composed of multiple regions and domestic trade costs are positive. 
Doing this exercise formally, however, would be extremely difficult because we would need to assign country-level 
trade imbalances across the different regions in a country, and those data are simply not available. 
Table 2—Gravity Estimates
International US domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log distance −1.084 −1.009 −1.038 −1.065 −1.023 −1.058
(0.05) (0.06) (0.019) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0173)
Common int. border 0.126
(0.13)
Common language 0.38
(0.10)
R2 0.987 0.999 0.985 0.987 0.987 0.988
Observations 650 650 2,220 3,737 2,080 2,215
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is (in logs)  λ ni ≡  X ni / X n for  n ≠ i , for 26 OECD countries, 
while in columns 3 to 6 is (in logs)  x mk / ∑ r∈ Ω n    x rm , for  m ≠ k , and  n = USA . Regions in the United States refer to: 
in column 3, 55 metropolitan areas (present in both CFS and OECD data), for 2007; in column 4, 74 metropolitan 
and consolidated statical areas, from CFS, for 2007; and 51 states in columns 5 and 6, for 2002 and 2007, respec-
tively. All regressions with importer and exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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export shares are considered; and the share of total intraregional trade in total domes-
tic trade for Canada—the other country for which we have these trade data—is 0.77 
in the model and 0.79 in the data (computed using trade between 13 Canadian prov-
inces, for 2007, from British Columbia Statistics).19
What are the implications of our calibrated model for domestic trade costs? For 
expositional purposes only, we aggregate our calibrated domestic trade costs at the 
country level using a procedure in Agnosteva, Anderson, and Yotov (2014),
(14)  τ nn =  ∑ 
m∈ Ω n 
 ( l m / L n ) ( ∑ k≠m, k∈ Ω n  ( l k / L n ) d mk −θ ) 
−1/θ . 
Figure 2 shows this index against our measure of country size, relative to the United 
States. Larger countries have larger domestic trade costs among its regions: the cor-
relation between  τ nn and our measure of country size ( ϕ n L n ) is 0.70, and 0.86 if we 
consider the number of regions in each country,  M n . For instance, while a small coun-
try like Denmark has  τ DNK, DNK , almost one-half of the US level, a large country like 
Japan has  τ JPN, JPN of around 70 percent of the US level. The six smallest countries 
in our sample have domestic costs that are one-half of the US level, while the corre-
sponding number for the six largest countries is 75 percent. The fact that domestic 
trade costs are increasing in country size already suggests that these costs will under-
mine the strength of aggregate scale effects; by how much is what we analyze next.
Finally, our estimates of domestic trade costs can be compared with estimates 
coming from the index developed by Head and Ries (2001) applied to domestic 
19 If we use the data on regional trade flows for the European Union, estimated by Thissen, Diodato, and 
van Oort (2013), to compute the intraregional share for the 15 EU countries in our sample, our calibrated model 
captures 90 percent of the variation observed in that data. 
Figure 2. Domestic Trade Costs: Calibration
Notes: Panel A: domestic frictions in symmetric model refer to  τ nn calculated using (11); in general model, they 
refer to  τ nn calculated applying the aggregation in (14) to the calibrated domestic costs  d mk . R&D-adjusted country 
size refers to  ϕ n L n , where  ϕ n is the share of R&D employment and  L n is equipped labor. Panel B: The Head and Ries 
index refers to: in the data,  d mk 
hr
 ≡  (( x mk  x km )/( x kk  x mm )) −1/(2θ) ; in the model, the expression in (13). Both  variables 
are calculated for 55 metropolitan areas in the United States.
1/1
,0
00
1/5
00
1/2
00
1/1
00
1/5
0
1/2
0
1/1
0
1/5 1/2 1
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1
R&D-adjusted country size, 
relative to US, in logs
D
om
es
tic
 fr
ic
tio
ns
, 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 U
S
, i
n 
lo
gs
Symmetric model
General model
Panel A. Domestic frictions and country size
50 10
0
25
0
50
0
1,
00
0
2,
00
0
3,
00
0
5,
00
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Distance, 
in logs
H
ea
d 
an
d 
R
ie
s 
in
de
x,
 in
 lo
gs
Model
Data
Panel B. Head and Ries index for US regions
3173Ramondo et al.: tRade, domestic FRictions, and scale eFFectsVol. 106 no. 10
trade for the United States. Using (1), and assuming symmetric trade costs between 
any two regions,  ( d mk hr ) −2θ ≡ ( x mk  x km )/( x kk  x mm ) . Panel B of Figure 2 shows trade 
costs across regions of the United States against distance, using our calibrated trade 
costs and the Head-Ries index for the subset of 55 US metropolitan areas for which 
trade flows are available from the CFS, for 2007, and  θ = 4 . While the distance 
elasticity for the model’s domestic costs is 0.27, as calibrated above, the one for the 
domestic costs calculated using the Head and Ries index is 0.28 (including origin 
and destination fixed effects). Additionally,  d mk hr has a higher mean than  d mk (3.29 
versus 2.55), suggesting that our estimates of domestic trade costs, at least for the 
United States, are on the conservative side.
B. The Role of Domestic Trade Costs
We use the calibrated model to explore how the presence of domestic trade costs 
affects the strength of scale effects on real wages. We ask two related questions: 
does the model with scale effects, international trade, and domestic trade costs match 
better the cross-country data on real wages vis-à-vis the model with no domestic 
trade costs? By how much do domestic trade costs contribute to match the data on 
cross-country income? We also evaluate both models on their prediction with respect 
to import shares, prices, and nominal wages, across countries of different size.
In the data, the real wage is computed as real GDP (purchasing power parity 
adjusted, or PPP-adjusted) from the Penn World Tables (7.1), divided by our mea-
sure of equipped labor so that it is simply TFP. In turn, import shares are calculated 
using international trade data from STAN; nominal wages are GDP at current prices, 
from the World Development Indicators, divided by our measure of equipped labor; 
and price indices are simply nominal wages divided by real wages. All variables are 
averages over the period 1996–2001 and are summarized in Table 1.
Figure 3 shows a decomposition of the real wage (relative to the US) implied 
by: the full model (dots); the model with only scale effects (crosses) which implies 
imposing  β 0 = 1 ,  β 1 = ∞ , and  β 2 = 0 ; the model with both scale effects and 
international trade but no domestic trade costs (squares) which implies impos-
ing  β 0 = 1 and  β 2 = 0 ; and the data (stars). Real wages are plotted against our 
measure of R&D-adjusted country size. Table A1 in the online Appendix shows the 
numbers behind the figure.
The model with only scale effects severely underestimates the real wage for 
the smallest countries (crosses versus stars): the real wage for a small country like 
Denmark is predicted to be only  33 percent of the level in the United States, reflect-
ing very strong scale effects at work. In contrast, the observed relative real wage of 
Denmark is  94 percent. For the six smallest countries in our sample, the model with 
only scale effects implies a relative real wage of  30 percent, whereas in the data these 
countries have an average real wage almost equal to the one in the United States. 
This is a reflection of a very high income-size elasticity in the model ( 1/θ = 0.25 ) 
in comparison with the one in the data which is not statistically different from zero 
(−0.006, standard error 0.03).
How much does adding international trade and domestic trade costs to the model 
help in matching the observed real wages for countries of different sizes? As the 
squares indicate in Figure 3, adding trade openness, but no domestic trade costs, 
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does not help much in bringing the model closer to the data. For example, the rela-
tive real wage for Denmark is  38 percent, only a small improvement over the model 
with only scale effects. A similarly small improvement is obtained for the six small-
est countries (from  30 to  33 percent), while the income-size elasticity is 0.22 (stan-
dard error 0.007).
It is important to clarify that, as expected, small countries do gain more from 
trade than large countries (see column 6 in Table A1 in the online Appendix). It 
is just that these gains are not large enough to have a substantial effect in closing 
the gap between the model with only scale effects and the data. Continuing with 
our previous example, Denmark has much larger gains from trade than the United 
States (22 versus 2.2 percent), but this almost ten-fold higher gains only increase its 
implied relative real wage from 33 to 38 percent.20
Comparing the dots and stars in Figure 3 reveals that the main contribution in 
getting the full model to better match the data comes from adding domestic trade 
costs. The mechanism comes from the fact that domestic trade costs are higher for 
larger countries, and hence they undermine scale effects. Again, for Denmark, our 
full model implies a relative real wage of  80 percent, much closer to the  94  percent 
observed in the data than the  33 percent implied by the model with only scale effects. 
A similar pattern is found for the six smallest countries in the sample: the full model 
is able to close by more than one-half the gap in the real wage between the data and 
the model with only scale effects, while openness to trade only closes such gap by 
around four percent. More generally, inspecting the income-size elasticity implied 
by the full model reveals that, even though still significantly positive (0.13, standard 
20 The gains from trade are calculated, in the general model with domestic frictions, as the average change in 
real wages, across regions in country  n , from autarky to openness to trade, weighted by the population share of each 
region. See Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Saborío-Rodríguez (2014) for a theoretical derivation of these gains 
under the general case in which labor is mobile across regions. 
Figure 3. Scale Effects, Trade Openness, and Domestic Trade Costs (Relative to US in logs)
Note: R&D-adjusted country size refers to  ϕ n L n , where  ϕ n is the share of R&D employment and  L n is equipped 
labor.
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error 0.02), it is one-half of the elasticity implied by the model with only scale 
effects (0.25).
Figure 4 compares calibrated versions of the models with and without domes-
tic trade costs regarding real and nominal wages, import shares, and price indi-
ces, across countries.21 Panel A makes clear that in the calibrated model with no 
domestic trade costs, real wages rise too rapidly across countries of different size: 
the size elasticity of the real wage is 0.20 (standard error 0.01), much higher than 
the zero elasticity observed in the data and double the one delivered by the model 
with domestic trade costs. Panels B and C show that the behavior of the real wage 
in the model with no domestic trade costs is the result of nominal wages that rise—
and prices that fall—too rapidly with size. The model with no domestic trade costs 
implies a size elasticity for the nominal wage and price index that are too high (in 
absolute value) relative to the ones in the data. Both elasticities are halved as we 
allow for domestic trade costs. Table A2 in the online Appendix reports the size 
elasticities and averages for each variable.
Even though both calibrated models match well the average import share in the 
data, the model with no domestic trade costs implies import shares that decrease 
too rapidly with country size (the size elasticity almost doubles the one in the data), 
while adding domestic trade costs decreases the trade-size elasticity by one-third, as 
suggested by our theoretical example in Figure 1.
C. Symmetry
The model with symmetric regions (Assumption 2) allows for a simpler calibra-
tion. This is because, as shown in Proposition 2, the model delivers a log-linear grav-
ity relationship for trade flows at the country level, a simple expression for internal 
trade costs in each country, and a simple formula for country-level gains from trade 
as in Arkolakis et al. (2012). We directly use (12) to compute the model-implied real 
wage, (8) to compute the real wage implied by the standard model without domestic 
trade costs, and  U n = γ ( ϕ n L n ) 1/θ for the model with only scale effects. We keep 
the value of  θ at  4 , which can now be directly obtained from estimates of the trade 
elasticity in the trade literature. We use the same values for  M n ,  L n, , and  ϕ n as above 
and set  T n =  ϕ n L n directly from (10).
The only task left is to calibrate  δ n , which can then be combined with our calibrated 
values for  θ and  M n to compute  τ nn using (11). We use data on domestic trade flows 
for the United States and the model’s equilibrium  equation  τ nn  θ =  M n ∑ m∈ Ω n    x mm / X nn , 
which can be obtained from manipulating (1) under Assumption 2. As above, we 
set  ∑ m∈ Ω n    x mm / X nn = 0.45 for the United States, which together with  M US = 70 
and  θ = 4 implies  τ US, US = 2.37 and hence, using (11),  δ US = 2.75 .
Lacking data on domestic trade flows for other countries in our sample, we 
impose  δ n =  δ US for all  n . Note that we are still allowing for differences in  τ nn across 
countries that come from differences in the number of regions in each  country,  M n ; 
this is precisely what will offset the economies of scale in the symmetric model with 
domestic trade costs.
21 The model without domestic trade costs is calibrated using the procedure described above, but assum-
ing  d mk = 1 for all  m, k ∈  Ω n . The R2 between bilateral trade shares in the data and the calibrated model is 0.94. 
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Panel A of Figure 2 shows the calibrated  τ nn ’s, relative to the United States, 
against country size (stars). Estimates are remarkably similar to the ones stemming 
from our general model (circles). On average, domestic trade costs calibrated under 
Assumption 2 are not very different from the ones calibrated using the general model 
(0.64 versus 0.63), but their size elasticity is higher (0.14 versus 0.09).
Inspecting panel B of Figure 3 reveals that the model with symmetric regions 
delivers a similar decomposition to the one obtained using the general model.22 The 
 size-elasticity implied by the symmetric model is 0.08 (standard error 0.02), a bit 
22 There is a slight difference in the nature of the exercises behind panels A and B of Figure 3 regarding how the 
case with trade but no domestic trade costs is computed. In panel A, trade shares result from taking the calibrated 
model and shutting down domestic trade costs, so that the resulting trade shares do not necessarily match the ones 
in the data. In contrast, in panel B, trade shares for the case with no domestic trade costs are exactly the ones in the 
data because the real wage is calculated directly, using (12). One may prefer to refer to the exercise in panel A as a 
Figure 4. Calibrated Model and Data (Relative to US in logs)
Notes: No dom.fric. refers to the model without domestic trade costs; dom. fric. refers to the model with domestic 
trade costs. In the data: the real wage is computed as real GDP (PPP-adjusted) divided by equipped labor,  L n ; the 
nominal wage is calculated as GDP at current prices divided by equipped labor,  L n ; the price index is calculated as 
the nominal wage divided by the real wage; and import shares refer to total imports, as share of absorption, in the 
manufacturing sector. R&D-adjusted country size refers to  ϕ n L n , where  ϕ n is the share of R&D employment and  L n 
is equipped labor. The dashed line is fitted through the data; the solid line is fitted through the model with domestic 
frictions; and the dot-dashed line is fitted through the model without domestic frictions.
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lower than for the general model (0.13), and one-third of the size elasticity implied 
by the model with only scale effects (0.25).23
III. Discussion
In this section, we discuss two issues: how our calibration procedure and results 
are related to other calibrations of trade models in the literature, namely Eaton and 
Kortum (2002); Alvarez and Lucas (2007); and Waugh (2010), and how the intro-
duction of nontradable goods, multinational production, and diffusion may affect 
our results regarding scale effects.
A. Domestic Trade Costs versus International Trade Cost Asymmetries
The effects of domestic trade costs could be replicated in a model without these 
costs but in which international trade costs and innovation intensity were chosen 
appropriately. As we show next, the key is whether one allows for asymmetries in 
international trade costs, and whether one deviates from Assumption 1 by allowing 
for a systematic pattern between innovation intensity and country size.
We compare the implications of three models that differ in terms of the assump-
tions on trade costs: symmetric international trade costs with domestic trade costs 
(RRS), as in this paper; asymmetric international trade costs with asymmetries 
arising from importer-specific terms (EK), as in EK; and asymmetric international 
trade costs with asymmetries arising from exporter-specific terms (W), as in Waugh 
(2010). To proceed, let  α ni =  α in for all  i ≠ n be the symmetric component of 
trade costs and consider the following alternative assumptions for trade costs:
ASSUMPTION 4A (Symmetric Trade Costs with Domestic Frictions):  τ  ni  RRS =  α ni 
for all  i ≠ n , and  τ nn  RRS as in  (11) .
ASSUMPTION 4B (Trade Costs with Asymmetries from Importer Effects): 
 τ ni  EK =  F n EK α ni  for all  i ≠ n and  τ nn  EK = 1 for all  n .
ASSUMPTION 4C (Trade Costs with Asymmetries from Exporter Effects): 
 τ ni W =  F i W α ni  for all  i ≠ n and  τ nn W = 1 for all  n .
We use the same parameter  θ and the same country sizes,  L n for all three mod-
els, but we allow for differences in technology levels and trade costs. The RRS 
model has technology levels  T n RRS satisfying Assumption 1, domestic trade costs as 
implied by Assumption 2, and international trade costs satisfying Assumption 4A. 
decomposition of forces in the calibrated model, and to the exercise in panel B as a comparison of models calibrated 
to the same data. 
23 Even under Assumption 2, exploring the implications of domestic trade costs on nominal wages, prices, and 
trade shares requires calibrating the full matrix of international trade costs. This is done in a way that mimics our 
calibration for the general case (see the online Appendix). The results are very similar to the ones for the general 
model: see Figure A1 and Table A2. 
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The EK model has the same technology levels as the RRS model,  T n EK = T n RRS , 
and trade costs satisfying Assumption 4B with  F n EK = 1/ τ nn  RRS . The W model has 
technology levels  T n W =  T n RRS ( τ nn  RRS ) −θ and trade costs satisfying Assumption 4C 
with  F n W = 1/ τ nn  RRS .
Proposition 4 follows directly from the expression for trade flows in  (4) and price 
levels in  (5) .
PROPOSITION 4: The RRS, EK, and W models generate the same equilibrium 
wages and trade flows. The equilibrium price levels are the same for the RRS and W 
models, but they differ in the EK model.
One can further show that implied prices in EK are systematically high in 
small countries when compared with implied prices in the RRS and W models, 
since  P n EK =  P n RRS / τ nn  RRS and  τ nn  RRS increases with size.24 This point is analogous to 
the one made by Waugh (2010), but applied here to large versus small as opposed to 
rich versus poor countries.
While Proposition 4 says that models W and RRS have the same implications 
for trade flows, wages, and prices, the mechanisms are different. To see this, note 
that  T n W =  T n RRS ( τ nn  RRS ) −θ combined with the fact that  τ nn  RRS is increasing in country 
size implies that  T n W increases less steeply with  L n than  T n RRS . In other words, larger 
countries are not richer in model W because their  T n / L n falls with  L n , whereas in 
model RRS this happens because  τ nn  RRS increases with  L n .
We now compare models W and RRS quantitatively by using the expression in 
(12),  U n =  T n 1/θ ×  λ nn −1/θ ×  τ nn −1 , together with data for domestic trade shares and 
real wages to compute the values of  T n . We set  τ nn = 1 to compute  ϕ n W ≡  T n W / L n , 
and  τ nn > 1 as calibrated in Section C, to compute  ϕ n RRS ≡  T n RRS / L n , where  L n is 
equipped labor from the data. We use the results to plot  ϕ n W (squares) and  ϕ n RRS (dots), both relative to innovation intensity in the data ( ϕ n data )—proxied by R&D 
employment shares—against our R&D-adjusted measure of country size ( ϕ n data L n ) 
in Figure 5.
The figure shows that the dashed line is significantly steeper than the solid 
line; the size elasticity for  ϕ n W / ϕ n data is −0.92 (standard error 0.10), while the one 
for  ϕ n RRS / ϕ n data is −0.34 (standard error 0.13). In other words, to be consistent 
with the data, a model without domestic trade costs requires research intensities to 
decrease rapidly with country size, while this relationship is mitigated when domes-
tic trade costs are included. As the figure clearly shows, research intensities in the 
data present a much flatter relationship across countries of different size than the 
ones implied by the model with no domestic trade costs.25 Of course, the finding 
that  ϕ n RRS / ϕ n data also decreases with country size is just the flip side of the finding in 
Section C that domestic trade costs do not fully reconcile the model with the data 
when we impose Assumption 1.
24 It is not possible to achieve a full equivalence between RRS and EK by deviating from  T n EK =  T n RRS , since the 
only way in which  (4) holds for the two models is by imposing  T n EK =  T n RRS and  F n EK = 1/ τ nn  RRS′ . 
25 Results are similar if research intensities are proxied by patents per capita, rather than by R&D employment 
shares. 
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We finish this subsection by briefly relating our results to those in Alvarez and 
Lucas (2007), whose calibrated model without domestic trade costs matches fairly 
well the relationship between size and import shares across countries. Like us, they 
impose Assumption 1 such that there is no variation in innovation intensity with 
country size, but they calibrate country size to match nominal GDP in the data. This 
is equivalent to allowing for differences in efficiency per unit of equipped labor 
across countries. For our sample of countries, the resulting efficiency parameters are 
decreasing in country size (i.e., equipped labor) with an elasticity of 0.10 (signifi-
cant at 1 percent). This implies that small countries have a significantly higher effi-
ciency per unit of equipped labor than large countries. Again, this is hard to defend 
given that small countries are not systematically better in terms of variables related 
to higher efficiency, such as schooling levels, corruption in government, rule of law, 
and bureaucratic quality.26
26 The size elasticities, calculated using OLS (and robust standard error), are nonsignificant for all the variables, 
except for bureaucratic quality (0.06, standard error 0.02). The data are the average years of schooling from Barro 
and Lee (2000), and indices ranging from zero (worst) to six (best) on corruption in government, rule of law, and 
bureaucratic quality, from Beck et al. (2001). 
Figure 5. Research Intensities and Size: Model and Data
Notes:  ϕ  n s ≡  T n s/ L n , with s = RRS for the model with domestic trade costs ( τ nn > 1), and s = W for the model 
without domestic trade costs ( τ nn = 1). Elasticities are −0.34 (solid line), and −0.92 (dashed line), significant at 
5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. The variable  ϕ n data is the share of R&D employment and  L n is equipped labor. 
 R&D-adjusted country size refers to  ϕ n data  L n .
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B. Nontradable Goods, Multinational Production, and Diffusion
The benchmark model introduced in Section I that we calibrate in Section II 
ignores intermediate goods, nontradable goods, multinational production, and inter-
national technology diffusion. How do these considerations affect our conclusions 
regarding scale effects?
Consider an extension of our model with final and intermediate goods in which (a 
CES aggregate of) intermediate goods are used in the production of each intermedi-
ate and final good. Allowing for scale effects as in our baseline model (Assumption 
1), assuming that regions are symmetric, as in Assumption 2, assuming that both 
types of goods are tradable, and using superscript  g for intermediates and super-
script  f for final goods, the real wage can be written as
(15)  U n =  γ ̃ ×  ( ϕ n L n )  (1+η) /θ ×  ( τ nn  g ) −η ×  ( τ nn  f ) −1 ×  ( λ nn g ) −η/θ ×  ( λ nn f ) −1/θ ,  
where
(16)  τ nn  s =  ( 1 _  M n +   M n − 1 _ M n   ( δ n s) −θ ) 
−1/θ
 ,  for s = g, f, 
and  η is a parameter that captures the importance of intermediate goods in the pro-
duction of both intermediate and final goods and is smaller than 1.27
If there were no domestic trade costs (i.e.,  τ nn  g =  τ nn  f = 1 ) and final goods were 
nontradable across countries (i.e.,  λ nn f = 1 ), as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), equa-
tion (15) would collapse to
  U n =  γ ̃ ×  ( ϕ n L n )  (1+η) /θ ×  ( λ nn g ) −η/θ . 
Calibrating  θ such that we target a growth rate of one-fourth, as in the baseline 
model (i.e.,  (1 + η) /θ = 1/4 ), this expression implies that scale effects are as 
strong as before but the gains from trade are lower ( η/θ < 1/θ ), implying an even 
bigger puzzle for the standard model.
Suppose instead that final goods are also nontradable among regions within a 
country. This is a version of the idea that domestic trade costs weaken scale effects. 
With  δ n  f → ∞ ,  τ nn   f =  (1/ M n ) −1/θ . Assuming that  l m =  l –, for all  m , so that all vari-
ation in country size comes from the number of regions, we have
  U n =  γ ̃ ×  ( ϕ n l – ) 1/θ ×  ( ϕ n L n ) η/θ ×  ( λ nn g ) −η/θ . 
Not surprisingly, assuming that final goods are nontradable across regions within 
countries implies weaker scale effects than in the baseline model ( η/θ < 1/θ ).
One problem with the assumption that final goods are nontradable is that we are 
missing the possibility of multinational production (MP), which is another source 
of openness, and relevant for final goods even among regions within a country. The 
27 Formally, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007),  η = (1 − α)/β , where  α and  β are the (Cobb-Douglas) shares of 
labor in final and intermediate good production. 
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simplest way to proceed is to allow for MP but not trade in final goods and for 
trade but not MP in intermediate goods.28 Following the analysis in Ramondo and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2013), and assuming for simplicity that domestic costs and shares 
for trade and MP are the same, the real wage would be
  U n =  γ ̃ ( ϕ n L n )  (1+η) /θ ×  τ nn − (1+η)  ×  λ nn − (1+η) /θ . 
With  (1 + η) /θ =1/4 , as before, the strength of the scale effects would be the same 
as in the baseline model; adding MP leaves the key role of domestic trade costs in 
reconciling data and model unaltered.29 In the general case, the key question is 
whether the gains from MP are able to bring the standard model closer to the data; 
as we show in the online Appendix, the answer is negative because large countries, 
like the United States, do not have systematically lower gains from MP than smaller 
countries, like Denmark.
Next, consider the role of another source of gains from openness: the diffusion 
of ideas across countries. We introduce diffusion in the simplest way by ignoring 
trade and assuming that an idea originated in country  i can be used in country  n but 
subject to an iceberg-type friction given by  h ni ≥ 1 , with  h ii = 1 . The real wage 
would now be
  U n =  γ D ×  ( ϕ n L n ) 1/θ ×  ξ nn −1/θ , 
where  ξ nn ≡  ϕ n L n / ( ∑ i  ϕ i L i h ni −θ ) is the share of domestic ideas in the total stock of 
ideas diffused to country  n .30 If there were no frictions to the diffusion of ideas across 
countries (i.e.,  h ni = 1 for all  n, i ), the real wage would be  U n =  γ D ( ∑ i  ϕ i L i ) 1/θ , and 
scale effects would operate at the world level with no consequence for the income 
of individual countries. This result suggests that including international technology 
diffusion would further bring our baseline model closer to the data regarding the 
strength of scale effects.31
Unfortunately, the big challenge is that diffusion is not directly observable in the 
data. Except for the small part that happens through licensing, technology diffusion 
does not leave a paper trail that can be used to directly measure the value of produc-
tion done in a country by domestic firms using foreign technologies.32 Our approach 
28 See the online Appendix for a detailed discussion of multinational production with domestic trade costs. 
29 Inspecting (16),  τ nn depends on  θ and is calibrated to match domestic trade flows in the data. Hence, as long 
as  (1 + η) /θ does not change,  τ nn − (1+η)  does not change either. 
30 One can allow for both trade and diffusion by assuming that each idea is a vector of productivities, one for 
each country, drawn independently from a Fréchet distribution, as in Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2010). In 
that case the expression above is augmented with the gains from trade,  U n =  γ D ×  ( ϕ n L n ) 1/θ ×  ξ nn −1/θ ×  λ nn −1/θ . 
31 In Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2010), we present a model with trade, MP, and diffusion of ideas, but no 
domestic frictions. The analysis including those frictions reveals that the role for diffusion is smaller than the one 
found in our previous paper. 
32 According to the data published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, royalties and licenses paid to US 
parents and foreign affiliates by unaffiliated parties for the use of intangibles represented only one percent of total 
affiliates sales, in 1999. Some indirect evidence points to the importance of international diffusion for growth. Eaton 
and Kortum (1996, 1999) develop a quantitative model that allows them to use international patent data to indirectly 
infer diffusion flows. They estimate that most of the productivity growth in OECD countries, except for the United 
States, is due to foreign research: between 84 percent and 89 percent in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, 
and around 65 percent for Japan. Keller (2004) also finds that, for nine countries that are smaller than the United 
Kingdom, the contribution of domestic sources to productivity growth is about ten percent. 
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in this paper is to go in an another, potentially more promising, direction: how much 
lower are the implied economies of scale at the country level once we add observ-
able sources of the gains from openness and domestic trade costs? We can attribute 
any remaining difference in TFP between the data and our model to nonobservable 
diffusion. Hence, our framework can be thought as an indirect way to discipline this 
unobservable flow.
IV. Conclusion
Models in which growth is driven by innovation naturally lead to aggregate econ-
omies of scale. This has the counterfactual implication that larger countries should 
be much richer than smaller ones. These scale effects are also present in new trade 
models. We argue that these implications are largely a result of the standard assump-
tion that countries are fully integrated domestically, as if they were a single dot 
in space. We depart from this assumption by treating countries as collections of 
regions that face positive costs to trade among themselves. We calibrate the model 
and evaluate the role of domestic trade costs in reconciling the theory with the data. 
By weakening scale effects, domestic trade costs are key to explain the discrepancy 
between the standard model and the data on TFP levels across countries. These 
domestic trades also make the model better match observed import shares, relative 
income levels, and price levels across countries.
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